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Many large constellations are being considered for deployment over the next ten years into low earth orbit (LEO). This paper
seeks to quantify the risks that these constellations pose to the debris environment, the risks that the debris environment poses
to these constellations, and the risks that these constellations pose to themselves.
The three representative constellations examined in detail in this paper are operated (or planned to be operated) by Spire
Global, Iridium, and OneWeb.
This paper provides a balanced risk analysis including collision risk, operational risk, and non-adherence risk. For
perspective, the risk posed by these economically useful constellations is compared to the risk associated with existing
abandoned hardware deposited in clusters.

INTRODUCTION
Various national and international agencies are
looking into the issues of space debris and space
traffic management today. The United States (U.S.)
Congress passed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act in November 2015 (the “Space
Launch Competitiveness Act”), which among other
things, ordered a study seeking “[r]ecommendations
related to the appropriate framework for the
protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the
public and economic vitality of the space industry.”
[1]
In response to this request, the Science Applications
International Corporation delivered the Orbital
Traffic Management Study Final Report to NASA on
November 21, 2016 (the “Traffic Management
Study”). Section 839, Orbital Debris, of the NASA
Transition Authorization Act of 2017, S.442, 3 Jan
2017 reads: "Congress finds that orbital debris poses
serious risks to the operational space capabilities of
the U. S.; an international commitment and integrated
strategic plan are needed to mitigate the growth of
orbital debris wherever possible…”
Of course, space debris is a global issue that must be
addressed globally. Of the approximately 23,000
catalogued space objects (greater than 10cm), only
6% are operational and only 1.7% are U.S.
commercial spacecraft. [2] Internationally, the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) issued draft guidelines for the long-term
sustainability of outer space activities in October
2016, [3] which were discussed in depth at the
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February 2017 meeting of COPUOS in Vienna. The
European Space Agency held its 7th European
Conference on Space Debris from April 18-21, 2017
where much of the focus was on constellations and
how the constellation operators should be regulated
relative to “typical” space operators. Many countries
are grappling with whether, when, and how to
address orbital debris concerns such as debris
mitigation and debris remediation whose importance
are both accentuated when considering the
deployment of large constellations.
In short, this is a very critical time with respect to
orbital debris issues. A time during which the
regulations that govern satellite operations for the
next 10-20 years will be promulgated. We agree with
the Traffic Management Study that “[i]t is of critical
importance that any policy adopted and any rules,
regulations, standards, and operational requirements
established are firmly based on physics, technical
considerations, and operational limitations and
timelines….” and that “[p]olicies and operational
requirements that are not sufficiently based on
informed physics and technical considerations will no
doubt create economic consequences, while
potentially not mitigating safety risks significantly.”
[4]
We hope that this paper provides a broad and
balanced perspective for thinking about the “wide
spectrum of risks” posed by and to constellation
operators. This, in turn, should help inform carefully
considered rules and regulations that mitigate
practical orbital debris concerns, while not stifling
the economic vitality of the satellite industry.
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BACKGROUND
This paper evaluates a range of risks including
collision, operational, and non-adherence risks. This
paper does not just focus on the risk of a constellation
to the environment, but also seeks to provide an
assessment of the potential hazard of the LEO
environment on the constellation in question and also
of the constellation in question on itself (i.e.,
fratricide).
We conduct this balanced risk analysis on three
representative constellations over the next 10-20
years; anything beyond that has growing
uncertainties from practical (i.e., new technologies
available), financial (i.e., changing economic market
conditions), and physical (i.e., different solar cycles)
perspectives. Longer term predictions will lack the
needed reliability and accuracy to be actionable. It is
important to complete an analysis that is relevant to
current rule making, operational tradeoffs, and debris
mitigation activities and not just producing academic,
non-actionable long-term observations.
The three representative constellations analyzed in
this paper are Iridium’s legacy constellation,
OneWeb’s planned Fixed Satellite Service (FSS)
constellation, and Spire Global’s current LEMUR-2
constellation. These constellations, in the aggregate,
provide a representative sample of the types of
satellites to be deployed into LEO over the next 1020 years.
First, Iridium has been operating for 20 years
providing an historical record of a LEO operator and
the risks that constellation operation poses to, and
faces from, the debris environment and itself. It has
station keeping capabilities, inhabits a relatively
spatially dense orbit (~780km), is moderate in mass
(~40,000 kg in aggregate), is moderate in areal crosssection (~300m2 in aggregate), and is less numerous
(72 satellites) compared to many proposed
constellations. It is also representative of Iridium
NEXT, the replacement constellation being launched
over the next few years that will be around for
another approximately 20 years.
Constellation management for Iridium is eased by
having all satellites with similar orbital periods and
altitudes. Looking at the publically-available Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) satellite catalog,
the “thickness” of the operational constellation (i.e.,
altitude span) is only 6km (773-779km).
Second, OneWeb proposes a large FSS comprising
720 satellites [5] in a high LEO (1200km) orbit that
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typifies the large FSS constellations proposed by
other operators such as SpaceX, Boeing, and Telesat.
Like Iridium, OneWeb will have station keeping but
has selected a relatively sparsely populated orbit
(~1200km), is high in mass (~108,000kg in
aggregate), high in areal cross-section (~2,500m2 in
aggregate), and it will be much more numerous than
Iridium (~720 vs ~72 satellites). OneWeb is quite
relevant as it, along with similar planned FSS
constellations, is being launched and will operate
over the next 10-20 years. It is assumed that OneWeb
will have a much larger “thickness” than Iridium
based on its FCC filing. The constellation was said to
be contained within 1% of its semi-major axis, so
±75km for a total width of 150km centered at
1200km.
Third is Spire Global’s LEMUR-2 constellation.
Spire Global is in the process of deploying a 175satellite constellation in the 400-600km altitude range
comprised of 3U CubeSats. 3U CubeSats typify the
most common type of small satellite being launched
today and which are expected to be launched over the
coming years. [7] Over the next seven years,
SpaceWorks estimates 2,400 nano/microsatellites
will require launch or 342 per year on average. [6]
However, estimates based on 15 year license terms
and/or aspirational operator plans tend to be very
optimistic.
For instance, SpaceWorks’s original 2016
Nano/Microsatellite Forecast of 210 satellites
estimated to be launched in 2016 was off by nearly
50% with only 101 nano/microsatellites actually
launched. [8] LEMUR-2s will deploy to relatively
less spatially dense orbits of 400-600km, are low in
mass (875kg in aggregate), low in surface area (16m2
in aggregate), and will lack station keeping. Spire, as
more of an ad hoc constellation, will naturally have a
“thicker” altitude span for the constellation (i.e.,
~200km).
In summary, the three constellations analyzed in this
paper provide a very representative sample of the
types of operating satellite constellations that may
populate LEO in the coming decades. We now turn to
a balanced risk analysis of each of our representative
constellations. Table 1, provided below, summarizes
qualitatively some of the characteristics of the three
constellations examined in this paper relative to each
other.
Now, we will develop relationships for collision risk
that will be used to characterize risks related to these
three constellations.
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Name

Type

Background
Debris
Hazard

Operational
Thickness

Aggregate
Mass

Aggregate
Areal CrossSection

Number

Station
Keeping

Table 1. The three constellations being examined in this paper comprise three typical constellation types.

Iridium
OneWeb
Spire

Historic LEO
New FSS
CubeSats

High
Low
Low

Thin
Moderate
Thick

Moderate
High
Low

Moderate
High
Low

Moderate
High
Moderate

Yes
Yes
No

COLLISION RISK
Background Spatial Density
Risk to the debris environment from collisions is
probability multiplied by consequence. We will first
examine probability and then consequence. The
probability of collision for a satellite from the
background debris hazard is given by:
PC = 1 – exp(-SPD x VR x AC x T)
Where PC = probability of collision for T
SPD = spatial density, number of debris per
cubic kilometer
VR = relative velocity, km/s (10km/s
average in LEO)
AC = areal/collision cross-section, km2
T = time, seconds
The full development for this expression is provided
in Appendix A. While much focus is on the
operational phase of a satellite’s orbital life, there is a
significant phase on each side of operations,
deployment and disposal, that are often overlooked.
During both phases there may be a significant risk
posed to or from these constellations. The higher the
operational altitude, the more transit time and
exposed area to the background population will
accumulate during both deployment and disposal. In
addition, for disposal it is very relevant how long the
operators will maintain control of their satellites.

The figure below shows the deployment locations for
each constellation overlaid on the spatial density
curves as derived from NASA’s ORDEM
engineering model provided by Mark Matney of
NASA/ODPO. Throughout the analysis, we will be
using the >1cm threshold to represent the lethal yet
nontrackable (LNT) debris and the >10cm threshold
to represent the cataloged population which is
trackable and potentially avoidable, if a satellite has
maneuver capabilities and successfully executes a
maneuver.
A 1cm impact would likely severely disrupt or
terminate the operations of a functioning satellite
while a trackable object (represented by the >10cm
population) would likely not only terminate the
mission of a functioning satellite but probably cause
the satellite to completely fragment.

More pointedly, if a retiring satellite is left to be
removed by atmospheric drag (i.e., maneuver
capability no longer functions) then these satellites
would be unable to avoid collisions with trackable
objects or direct reentry to an ocean (i.e., a sparsely
populated area of the globe).
Given that the primary variable in determining
probability of collision is spatial density of existing
resident space objects (such as debris fragments and
derelict hardware) of an orbit, we must first examine
the spatial density of orbits where Iridium, OneWeb,
and Spire constellations (will) transit and reside.
ERAU #1175

Figure 1. The locations of the three constellations
are plotted on the spatial density curves for orbital
debris in LEO.
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risk to other satellites in that orbit. This long transit
does raise at least three questions:

Probability of Collision
The table below quantifies the probability of collision
of each constellation during its respective
deployment, operations, and disposal phases.

-

Neither deployment nor disposal are relevant for the
Spire constellation since these CubeSats operate
where they are deployed and are removed from orbit
via atmospheric drag. Both OneWeb and Iridium
nominally will have their satellites deployed initially
at ~500km but the deploy operations for Iridium
satellites is much shorter due to the proximity of their
lower operational altitude (~780km vs ~1200km for
OneWeb).

If a OneWeb satellite and another operational
satellite are warned of a potential close
approach – who must move? Should the
satellite whose orbits are being crossed have
the “right of way” during OneWeb’s elective
journey to 1200km?
Is the risk imposed by the OneWeb transit
higher or lower than the risk of deploying a
DOA satellite at 1200 km? And, to whom?
Is a DOA satellite lingering for a long period
at 1200km safer or more risky than a DOA
satellite lingering for a shorter period at
500km?

-

For OneWeb, the current conops is that once the
spacecraft is verified as sound, it will use its electric
thruster to transit the most densely populated portion
of LEO to achieve its ~1200km operational orbit in
about six months. The intent of this deployment plan
is to ensure that no satellites are dead on arrival
(DOA) at 1200km where they would linger for over
100 years. However, the transit does itself pose a
non-trivial collision risk to the constellation, as seen
in the table below.

Iridium’s disposal plan is to lower the perigee of 10
of its satellites to 600km then rely on atmospheric
drag to de-orbit these satellites within 25 years and
lower the perigee of its remaining satellites to 250km.
[9] OneWeb’s disposal plan is to lower the perigee of
its satellite’s orbit to 200km and de-orbit from that
altitude, effectively transiting back through LEO, a
process they estimate will take less than one year.
[10]

Assuming all goes to plan, this deployment transit
poses little risk to other operational satellites since
OneWeb has the capability to avoid cataloged
objects. Of course, a disabled OneWeb satellite in
any part of the transit then poses a background debris

OneWeb hopes to maintain active control all the way
to reentry minimizing the possibility of debris
landing on populated areas. For Spire, the current
concept of operations is to naturally decay from its
operational orbits using atmospheric drag, thus its

Spire

175

500 ± 100
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~2500m2
~16m2

4.4E-3
[1.1E-4]
0.20
[7.1E-3]

N/A

0

0.07
[1.8E-3]
0.15
[4.8E-3]
3.2E-4
[4.3E-5]

515yr
1 yr
~5yr

Probability of Collision
(1cm / 10cm)

1200 ± 75

500km
1mo
500km
6mos

Disposal

Time to Dispose

720

~300m2

Operational Collision Risk /
Year
(1cm / 10cm)

OneWeb

4m2
560kg
3.5m2
150kg
0.09m2
5kg

Probability of Collision
(1cm / 10cm)

776 ± 6

Deployment

Start Altitude and
Duration

Altitude and Span (km)

72

Total Aggregate Cross-Section

Number of Satellites

Iridium

Single Satellite Cross-Section /
Mass

Cluster/ Constellation

Table 2. Probability of collision values for all phases of the three constellations are detailed below.

~0.4
~0.05
~0.30
[1.4E-2]
~1.5E-3
~2.0E-4
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For Iridium and OneWeb, the PC with objects >
10cm is listed in brackets. The number given
represents probability based on raw calculations
without regard to a satellite’s ability to maneuver to
avoid these collisions. The actual probability of such
satellites having a collision during their operational
lifetime given their propulsive capabilities is one that
should be studied in more depth. On the one hand,
one would hope that given the ability to maneuver
around trackable objects the collision probability
should be lower than one derived solely from surface
area and spatial density calculations.
On the other hand, satellites cannot maneuver around
LNT fragments which can disable them making them
non-maneuverable. In addition, satellites that are put
into disposal orbits cannot maneuver during the
disposal portion of their orbital lifetimes, which for
Iridium would be as long as its operating lifetime in
some cases. Finally, Iridium 33 has shown that the
probability of collision with trackable objects is
certainly not zero. Given the PC/yr in Table 2, there
is a 3.5% chance over 20 years a collision with a
trackable object would occur. In fact, we know about
one Iridium collision with a trackable object over the
past twenty years given that they had about 70
operational satellites implies a 1.4% probability of
failure (i.e., 1/70 over 20 years). We discuss below
some of the reasons why propulsion is no panacea
ERAU #1175

The table below provides an assessment of the
consequence if a satellite of each of the
representative constellations fragments completely
due to an explosion or collision with a cataloged
debris fragment (i.e., the amount of debris created is
proportional to the mass of the respective satellite).
For each event, there will be 1.5 trackable fragments
per kg of mass of satellite and 15 LNT per kg of mass
of satellite created. These fragments will largely be
spread above and below the center of each
constellation by 100km (so a total spread of 200km).
The debris will reside more near the center of the
resulting debris cluster: 40% of the fragments in the
middle 50km and 75% within the middle 100km. The
spatial density in the table above represents the
middle 50km; the densest part of the resultant debris
cluster. The last column depicts the contribution of
this newly created debris relative to the existing
debris population at the operational orbit of each of
our constellations. For example, a value of 0.5 means
that the spatial density would be increased by 50% if
such a fragmentation took place.
Table 3. The consequence of a satellite fragmentation
within each constellation is proportional to the mass
of a member of each constellation.
Fragments

Spatial Density

Relative to Debris
Background at
Operational Orbit
>10cm
>1cm

>10cm

>1cm

>10cm

>1cm

Iridium

The collision risk during operations will fluctuate for
Spire based on the solar cycle while OneWeb’s
collision risk should stay constant unless debrisgenerating events happen near it. A large debris
generating event at 1200km will materially change
the orbital environment and increase the probability
of collision for many decades because atmospheric
drag at 1200km has little effect. We address the
impact of this fratricidal case below.

Consequence

840

8,400

1.1E-8

1.1E-7

0.53

0.13

OneWeb

The PC/yr for operations for the total constellation
for Iridium and OneWeb are within a factor of three;
whereas Spire is orders of magnitude lower. Iridium
is located in a more densely populated region but the
OneWeb constellation has a greater aggregate crosssectional area. Iridium is clearly operating at an
altitude that presents the highest probability of
collision with regard to debris, partially due to an
earlier Iridium collision. Interestingly, deployment of
the OneWeb constellation over six months exposes it
to greater PC than a full year of operations. Disposal
of OneWeb satellites poses the greatest PC as their
transit is twice as long (nominally) as deployment.

under “Operational Risk”. This is certainly an area
that requires more study as it is evident that much of
the collision risk is due to human interactions and not
purely based physics models.

225

2,250

2.5E-9

2.5E-8

0.36

0.25

Spire

probability of collision for disposal is the same as for
its operational phase.

7

70

2.4E-10

2.4E-9

0.03

0.03

What can be seen from the above table is that for any
one catastrophic collision of a satellite in one of the
constellations studied in this paper, Spire’s LEMUR2 satellites have the least consequence relative to the
debris environment (and its own orbit). A breakup in
the Iridium constellation has the greatest effect (due
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to the larger spacecraft). Adding the consequence of a
certain number of catastrophic collisions within the
various constellations back into the collision risk is
helpful in understanding the consequence of
catastrophic collisions within these constellations on
themselves. It should be noted that Iridium is already
at the worst possible altitude (partially due to a
previous collision involving an Iridium satellite) and
so a 53% increase from another Iridium collision is
more significant than a 36% increase from a OneWeb
collision.
Another way to look at this this fratricide effect is to
examine the ratio of the number of trackable debris
fragments produced (shown above in Table 3) by the
number of satellites in the constellation. The results
of this are shown in Table 4 below highlighting that a
destructive event is proportionally worse for the
Iridium constellation and least impactful for the Spire
constellation.
Table 4. A debris–generating event would be
proportionally
worse
for
the
Iridium
constellation and least impactful to the Spire
constellation.
Trackable
Fragments
from
Destruction
of Member

Members of
the
Constellation

840
225
7

72
720
175

Iridium
OneWeb
Spire

Ratio of
Fragments
Produced to
Members of
Constellation

~12
~0.3
~0.04

PERSPECTIVE

in comparison to even monolithic GEO satellites,
there are existing groupings of abandoned resident
space objects that are more troublesome to future
debris growth than any of the three constellations
reviewed.
Three clusters of massive derelict objects will now be
detailed and compared to the three constellations.
Each cluster is named by the center altitude of each
cluster (e.g., C850 is a cluster centered around
850km). A cluster is defined as a set of space objects
with identical inclinations and similar altitude.
Empirical analyses have shown that the members of
these clusters interact with each other more than
modeled by the probability of collision equation
presented earlier that is based on the kinetic theory of
gases.[11] Note that each cluster is comprised of a set
of rocket bodies (RB) and the payloads (PL) that the
RBs deployed.
Table 5 below provides some key characteristics of
these three clusters relative to the three constellations
being analyzed. Table 6 below provides the
probability of collision values for the entire cluster or
constellation. OneWeb and Iridium values are in
brackets for the reasons discussed above.
Tables 5 and 6 highlight the very probable large
number of impacts from LNT over the long-term.
These types of impacts will trigger anomalies to the
operational spacecraft and bursts of small number of
more LNT from non-debilitating impacts on
constellation members but much more so from the
clusters of massive derelicts.

While the number of satellites in these constellations
creates large aggregate areal and mass characteristics

Constellation

Cluster

Table 5. Comparing the three constellations against three clusters of massive derelicts provides a perspective on
the criticality of these disparate space hardware collections.
Number of
Objects

Ave crosssection (m2) /
mass (kg)

Total
Area
(m2)

Total Mass
(kg)

Altitude
Span
(km)

Annual InterCluster
Collision
Rate

Cataloged (LNT)
Fragments from
Collision Event

C775

89
(45RB &
44PL)

RB: 14/1434
PL: 6/800

900

~100,000

60

~1/500

~4,500
(~45,000)

C850

36
(18RB &
18PL)

RB: 44/8300
PL: 8/3250

936

~208,000

45

~1/1200

~16,000
(~160,000)

C975

286
(144RB &
142PL)

RB: 14/1434
PL: 6/800

3,000

~560,000

85

~1/120

~4,500
(~45,000)

Iridium

72

4/560

300

~40,000

6

N/A

OneWeb

720

3.5/150

2,500

~108,000

150

N/A

Spire

175

0.09/5

16

875

200

N/A

ERAU #1175

~1,600
(~16,000)
~450
(~4,500)
~14
(~140)
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Table 6. The probability of collision calculations for each of the constellations and clusters highlights the
enormity of both collections of space hardware.
Red:~10-1
Black: ~10-2
Grey: <10-2

Total Constellation/Cluster
>1cm

>10cm

Name

Altitude (km)

SPD
1cm

SPD
10cm

PC 1yr

PC 10yr

PC
20yr

PC 1yr

PC 10yr

PC 20yr

C775

775

8E-07

2E-08

0.2031

0.8967

0.9893

0.0057

0.0552

0.1073

C850

850

1E-06

3E-08

0.2556

0.9478

0.9973

0.0088

0.0847

0.1623

C975

975

3E-07

2E-08

0.2471

0.9415

0.9966

0.0187

0.1724

0.3151

Iridium

776

8E-07

2E-08

0.0701

0.5164

0.7662

[0.0018]

[0.0180]

[0.0357]

OneWeb

1200

2E-07

6E-09

0.1470

0.7960

0.9584

[0.0048]

[0.0466]

[0.0910]

Spire

500

6E-08

8E-09

0.0003

0.0030

0.0059

0.000040

0.0004

0.0008

It should be noted these three clusters amount to
about 20% by mass and number of derelicts in LEO
so this continual interaction may become relevant
over the long-term as massive non-operational
objects continuously create large numbers of more
LNT. Don Kessler even raised this potential concern
for a cascading of small, but destructive, debris to be
more likely and more imminent than the classic
Kessler Syndrome he has been known for. [12]
Now for some perspective on consequence from
Table 6. A collision in C850 will have the greatest
consequence as the rocket bodies in C850 are SL-16s
that have a mass of 8,300kg with a length of 11m and
diameter of 3.9m. If two of these were to have a
hypervelocity collision then about ~16,000 trackable
fragments would be created. This would double the
cataloged population in one instance. The payloads
that occupy C850 with the 18 SL-16s have masses of
3,250kg; a collision between them would also likely
create ~16,000 large fragments..

annual collision rate is smaller but is still 1/1200
(~0.1% per year).
As discussed earlier, the effects of drag are critical in
considering the lingering risk posed by debris
production. The figure below shows how these
regions of drag effects might influence risks and need
for more regulations. The figure below plots perigee
altitude (since that largely determines drag effects)
versus inclination for all rocket bodies in the Satellite
Catalog from late 2016; there were 968, many of
which are in the three clusters examined in this paper.
Spire is clearly in the high drag effect region (green
tinting). Iridium and two of the clusters are in the
intermediate drag effect zone (yellow tinting) where
the primary drag effects will be felt during periods of
high solar activity. OneWeb and the last cluster are in
the low drag effect region (red tinting) where drag
has very little cleansing effects except for the very
smallest objects (e.g., less than 1cm).

Alternatively, C975 has the greatest probability with
nearly 300 derelict objects spanning only 85km. In
addition, if a collision occurs in C975 or C850 the
resulting debris will remain in orbit many decades
while debris from C775 collisions will likely have
significant wash out over a few decades. Collisions in
C975, while not as severe as the C850 collisions, will
still likely create about 4,500 trackable fragments.
This would make it one of the top three breakups
ever and there is a 1/120 chance (i.e., ~1%) each year
of such an event occurring. The C850 inter-cluster

ERAU #1175

Figure 2. Drag effects provide an important aspect of
the space hardware residing in LEO.
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OPERATIONAL RISK
It is quite haunting that an event that could double the
catalog population has at least a 1/1200 chance of
occurring annually (i.e., C850). Any of these intercluster collisions would produce significant amounts
of debris that would measurably affect satellites
within ±100-150km. While OneWeb is largely above
the fray from these events, they might be affected by
collisions in C975 but Iridium is right in the middle
of C775 and just below C850. The figure below
shows the three constellations and three clusters
plotted on the same ORDEM-derived spatial density
curves for LEO.

Figure 3. Depicting the cluster locations relative to
the constellations shows how there may be a
relationship between these two different types of
space hardware.
The spatial density plot (number of objects of three
size thresholds per volume plotted against altitude)
shows that Spire and OneWeb have both selected
altitudes for their constellations out of the most
debris-populated regions of LEO.
What may not be apparent, but is instructive to state
explicitly, is that the clusters of massive derelicts
have larger aggregate masses and collision crosssections than the three constellations yet these
derelict objects have no means to detect or maneuver
away from collisions like operational satellites.
However, there is little attention being taken of these
objects.
So, one may ask, with constellation members with
individual satellite masses orders of magnitude less
than the abandoned rocket bodies and dead payloads
in neighboring clusters plus likelihood of interconstellation collisions near zero, what should the
aerospace community be focusing their attention on?

ERAU #1175

The debris environment places certain operational
risks/burdens on operators and they, in turn, place
certain operational risks/burdens on each other,
including resource expenditures and risks of financial
loss. Operationally, close approach analysis and
mitigation poses a significant resource burden for
maneuverable satellite systems and constellations. In
scenarios where no maneuver is undertaken, there is
still significant expenditures of labor due to the
number of meetings, follow-on analysis and interand intra-operator coordination required. In some
cases, these activities require an equivalent number
of personnel necessary to support launch and early
operations. In scenarios where a maneuver is
undertaken, fuel is expended and useful life of the
satellite asset is potentially cut short.
In contrast, constellations that cannot maneuver are
able to avoid much of the effort that comes along
with close approach coordination, since their ability
to mitigate the threat is based on atmospheric drag
which costs nothing in terms of spent propellant and
only minor disruptions to their operations. The
challenge for future constellations (and those that
regulate them) in increasingly crowded orbits is to
find a workable set of customs and reliable set of
tools that addresses close approach warnings as a
routine and expected situation with delegated
responsibilities tied to agreed-upon courses of action.
First, there are a number of common misconceptions
that will need to be understood for any meaningful
traffic management framework to be implemented:
(i) all close approaches are the same, (ii) information
on close approaches is fairly accurate, and (iii)
maneuvers can be executed perfectly and in a timely
fashion and, thereby, eliminate the risk of collision.
Misconception 1: All close approaches are the same.
As a community, satellite operators do not do a good
job of differentiating and detailing the differences
between various potential collisions in terms of
probabilities and consequences. A near collision
involving two derelict rocket bodies is a completely
different scenario from a close approach between two
operational satellites, yet they may both be lumped
into the same close approach bin. Papers that merely
study number of close approaches, we feel miss the
point. Specifically, hundreds of 1km close
approaches pose much less risk then a single 100m
conjunction.
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As a satellite operator, all other resident space objects
are effectively navigation hazards with variable and
inconsistent knowledge of each hazard’s state. As
illustrated above, the number of derelict vehicles and
debris are more than an order of magnitude greater
than the number of active operational satellites.
Therefore, the odds are that close approaches will
occur between an active satellite and components of
the debris environment which are not capable of
maneuvering (rather than a maneuverable satellite).
Thus, space traffic management operator-to-operator
procedures, while necessary, may not be relevant in a
large majority of close approaches. Overly simple
rules as what operators “must” do may not have any
practical impact on most close approaches, while
having large economic impacts on such operators.
Misconception 2: Information on close approaches is
fairly accurate.
Three critical pieces of information regarding a close
approach may be wrong or irrelevant.
First, the knowledge of your own satellite’s position
is usually accurate to less than 100m in LEO.
Unfortunately, in most cases a radar-derived position
of the owner operator satellite used to compute the
close approach will never be as accurate as their own
knowledge of their satellite. This may lead the
operator to ignore an externally-derived close
approach warning.
Secondly and similarly, the knowledge of the
conjuncting object’s state is important. It may either
be static (i.e., from update to update it is unchanging)
which leads to questions regarding the currency of
the information. Alternatively, it may be highly
variable with each update; this may be the result of
the object’s high area-to-mass ratio or radar tasking
inconsistencies.
The third piece of information that results in a
tendency to discount the close approach notification
is the published covariance matrix for the offending
object. The published uncertainty for the other object
is often many orders of magnitude greater than the
uncertainty for the state knowledge for the owner
operator satellite. This lack of certainty in position
knowledge may frustrate attempts to determine the
best course of action and create discussions within an
operator resulting in further analysis and expenses. In
these typical cases, where there is a great disparity
between the covariance between the two objects,
statistics dictate that action is discouraged since the
benefits are highly questionable. In some cases,
executing a maneuver might be more likely to cause
ERAU #1175

Figure 4. Conjunction characterization is very
complicated due to lack of knowledge and natural
variability of orbital data.
the collision you are trying to avoid versus just doing
nothing.
In fact the risk from information defects and
modelling outcomes of maneuvers can be quantified
for each of our constellations using the following
criteria: (1) object altitude, (2) object status, (3)
object attitude, and (4) propulsive capability.
Vehicle altitude is a means to account for the
predictability of the orbit and, therefore, the
consistency and quality of the resulting trajectory
solution. Objects above 800km are not affected
significantly by atmospheric drag and are simpler to
track and maintain precision orbital solutions, while
objects below 600km are significantly perturbed by
atmospheric drag and require near persistence
monitoring to provide accurate information regarding
their trajectory. Resident Space Objects (RSO)
between 600 and 800km orbit are in a more benign
atmospheric environment with nearly linear decay
rates of years and are heavily influenced by solar
activity.
The object’s status (i.e., either operational or derelict)
is a significant aspect in its risk assessment. An
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active vehicle with a functioning transponder or
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver will have a
more accurate ephemeris than a non-operational
vehicle at the same altitude. Again, the number of
active satellites is small compared to the debris
population, but this factor in and of itself has a large
effect on the risk assessment.
The object’s attitude (e.g., tumbling, nadir pointing)
also plays an important role. Predicting the motion of
an inactive tumbling object is challenging below
450km due to the differential drag forces acting on
the satellite as opposed to a 3-axis-stabilized satellite
with a near constant cross-sectional area exposed to
the ram direction. This risk factor is a measure of the
solution’s stability and ability to provide long-term
insight into how the object’s trajectory will evolve.
When modeling an intact unknown object, a
reasonable starting point for its area-to-mass ratio is
0.01 m2/kg. This ratio holds for 3U CubeSats up to
2,000kg
satellites.
Many
spacecraft
have
approximately the same area-to-mass ratio due to
common space system reliance on solar panels for
power generation and the density with which
electronics and components can be packed.
The final factor is whether the system has or had a
propulsion system. As discussed above, the ability to
maneuver is not a panacea for negating the risk of
collision. Propulsion systems provide a course of
action with additional independent risks that need to
be assessed.
This risk assessment approach provides a first order
metric regarding the complexity of the encounter, the
amount of tracking required and, more importantly,
the timeline available to resolve. Using this approach,
the most benign object on this scale is a stable low
area-to-mass ratio, active satellite above 1100km and
the most difficult to model object is an active
unstable satellite with propulsion orbiting between
200-450 km. The low LEO active satellite that is
unstable, encountering faults and anomalies pose a
greater risk to effective maneuvers due to its rapid
decay rates and the potential for an off-nominal
maneuver. However, this risk is largely offset by the
shorter orbital lifetimes of these low-LEO payloads.
Misconception 3: Maneuvers can be executed
perfectly and in a timely fashion and, thereby, reduce
the risk of collision.
Maneuvers are usually complicated events that
require planning, potentially heaters to be warmed,
and uploading commands to the vehicle to execute
the burn. All of this takes time, and in the case where
ERAU #1175

there is sufficient time, this can be worked out to
decrease the probability of collision, but not erase it
or the consequences of an impact. In addition, most
maneuvers are asynchronous events planned in
advance for stationkeeping or orbit maintenance.
Even in these benign cases, something may go awry
or end up off nominal. Since fuel is usually the
critical life-limiting quantity on a satellite, the usual
maneuver strategy is to plan for 80% of the
correction in the first maneuver with a subsequent
maneuver for fine tuning. This conservative approach
(from a fuel management perspective) may not be the
optimal approach from a collision avoidance
perspective.
Given these constraints on the system, the chance that
a mostly correct maneuver will avoid an object with a
significant uncertainty in its state is a challenging
task. However, the advent of electric thrusters
provides some extra flexibility and capability in this
regard. Additionally, the chance for operator error or
a system fault is non-zero and is usually not included
in the calculus to select the most prudent course of
action. It cannot be overstated that the CosmosIridium collision of 2009 was enabled by a planned
and ostensibly safe maneuver. This is especially true
for CubeSats; while it may seem logical that
CubeSats present less risk to others if they have a
propulsive capability (and thus the ability to avoid a
collision), many familiar with typical CubeSat
operators have posited that giving a novice space
operator this added capability might actually backfire
from a collision probability perspective.
It is clear that operational risk are burdens imposed
by the debris environment on constellations and by
constellations on themselves and other operators. In
addition, these risks raise complicated issues for
space traffic management that simple rules (everyone
carry insurance, everyone carry propulsion, etc.)
cannot solve. For instance, there is zero chance for
Spire to impose a risk of loss on Iridium given the
different altitudes they inhabit. However, there is a
risk for Iridium to impose a loss on Spire given that it
intends to put the Iridium satellites into a disposal
orbit that intersects with Spire’s. Should Iridium have
to buy insurance in favor of Spire? Similarly,
OneWeb plans to transit orbits used by Iridium. If an
Iridium and OneWeb satellite collide, whose fault is
it? Who needs to move in case of a conjunction
event? Do these maneuvers require a set of rules
ahead of time?
What about debris caused by a satellite’s destruction,
say Iridium-33, which pollutes the orbits of other
operators and necessitates many maneuvers a year? Is
Page 10 of 15

it Iridium’s “fault” that a OneWeb satellite is hit by
debris from the Iridium-33 collision event when
transiting that altitude? Should Iridium’s insurance
have to cover that eventuality especially given that
OneWeb is choosing to transit Iridium’s orbits? We
do not necessarily have answers to these questions,
but believe the complexity involved counsels
strongly against overly simplistic and inflexible rules.

launched into high LEO orbits (and thereby violate
the 25-year guideline) do significantly raise the
amount of debris in LEO over extended periods. [14]
Given the comparable area-to-mass ratio of larger
satellites, we see no reason why non-adherence to the
25-year guideline is not equally or more concerning
for large satellites, especially since by definition they
would result in more derelict mass abandoned on
orbit.

NON-ADHERENCE RISK
Non-adherence risk is the risk that an operator cannot
or does not comply with rules and regulations in
place to minimize debris generation. Currently, this
refers to the 25-year de-orbit guideline and
minimization of debris directive set out in the IADC
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (advocated by
several international entities) and in various national
requirements or customs that derive therefrom. The
25-year de-orbit guideline states that an object
passing through LEO should de-orbit within 25 years
of mission completion. Adherence to the existing 25year guideline has been much less than expected as
can be seen in Figure 5, inserted below.
We think considering non-adherence risk is relevant,
because non-adherence has a large impact on other
risks and regulators should consider the risk of nonadherence with any rule or system they adopt. The
Traffic Management Study found that CubeSats that
are launched into lower LEO orbits (and thereby
follow the 25-year guideline) do not significantly
raise the risk of collision in LEO. [13] Other studies
have found that CubeSats without propulsion systems

This non-adherence comes in three basic forms: (i)
permitted non-adherence, (ii) technical nonadherence, and (iii) willful non-adherence.
Permitted non-adherence can occur when a
jurisdiction does not have any orbital debris rules or
allows an operator to obtain a waiver of those rules
(either prospectively or retroactively). Given that
background guidelines are from the United Nations
and IADC, some countries are more committed to
meeting them than others. New rules must apply and
be enforced internationally in order to prevent the
effective arbitraging of regulatory regimes.
Technical non-adherence occurs when a satellite
cannot adhere to established rules. For instance, when
a given satellite is deployed in a dead on arrival state
or when a given satellite is disabled by background
debris, as described previously or otherwise fails on
orbit.
Willful non-adherence occurs when an operator
violates the orbital debris mitigation requirements to
which it is subject in a voluntary way, in other words,

Figure 5. Debris mitigation compliance has not been very good over the last 15 years. Source: Journée de
Synthèse Débris, Review of Mitigation Rules Compliance in LEO (2000-2014) (June 9, 2015). FSOA is the
French Space Operations Act.
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is able to comply but does not. This might occur
when end of life maneuvers do not result in an orbit
that meets the 25-year guideline or such maneuvers
are not performed before such time as fuel is
inadequate to complete them. Given that it is
impossible to distinguish between willful and
technical non-adherence without evidence available
only from the operator or following a government
investigation, we are making no claims or
implications in this paper that anyone has willfully
violated the 25-year guideline or their orbital debris
mitigation plans. However, we do note, as a general
matter, that there is a huge economic incentive to
keep a high value asset operating as long as possible
in orbit and that systems fail in unexpected ways and
at unexpected times leading to at least technical nonadherence in many cases.
We now examine all three of our constellations
through the lens of “non-adherence risk”.
Iridium is the only constellation examined with an
operational track record which can be evaluated.
While Iridium was launched before the 25-year
guideline was implemented (in fact its constellation is
subject to much more stringent requirements),
Iridium has asked the FCC for the newer less
stringent 25-year guideline to apply. This is an
example of permitted non-adherence (a waiver of
stricter existing requirements), although the FCC
should be commended for only waiving in part the

more stringent rules to which Iridium was originally
subject. [16]
In terms of technical non-adherence, Iridium inhabits
an altitude where a satellite dead on arrival, disabled
by background debris, and/or running out of fuel will
not de-orbit for 200 years. In addition, Iridium
satellites must continue to function and preserve
enough fuel to complete their end of life maneuvers.
In fact, their plan states specifically that “satellite
disposal is predicated on the end-of-life satellite
retaining sufficient functionality to accomplish the
disposal maneuver sequence.” [15] Therefore,
technical non-adherence risk is high for Iridium.
This is shown by actual experience as documented in
Figure 6 below which plots operational altitudes of
Iridium satellites over time. This chart shows that at
least two of Iridium satellites have failed to execute
on their deorbit plans out of 11 end-of-life satellites
by 2015 (or 19% non-compliance). [17] Still this
record is better than the average compliance as
shown in Figure 5, at least so far.
Turning to OneWeb, there is no history of permitted
non-adherence, as OneWeb has not asked for any
exemptions from the 25-year guideline. In fact,
OneWeb’s disposal plan appears to be far better than
the 25-year guideline. In addition, OneWeb’s
deployment plan has satellites deploying at 500 km,
where they would still meet the 25-year guideline in a

Figure 6. Iridium’s track history of deorbiting old satellites is better than the industry average and may improve
as they respond to the next generation satellites being deployed to upgrade their constellation.
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dead on arrival scenario, which mitigates technical
non-adherence risk in the deployment phase.
However, there remains the possibility of a OneWeb
satellite being disabled at its operational altitude and
thus not de-orbiting for hundreds of years. As
discussed previously, there is also risk inherent in
OneWeb’s transit through LEO which should be
carefully weighed against the risk of a dead on arrival
satellite at OneWeb’s operational orbit. This risk can
best be mitigated by higher reliability systems.
Spire’s LEMUR-2 constellation is purposefully
deployed into altitudes that will meet the 25-year
guideline under a worst case dead on arrival scenario.
[18] Spire is relying on physics to meet the guideline.
While popular consensus is that CubeSats are largely
non-compliant to debris mitigation guidelines, Figure
5 actually noted the large increase in compliance with
the 25-year guideline in 2014 when CubeSats were
first considered. Compliance jumped from 60% to
over 80% when CubeSats were considered. Given
that compliance was in the range of 50-70% before
CubeSats, sensational news stories that 1 in 5
CubeSats violates the 25-year guidelines (20%)
actually demonstrates a higher level of compliance
than the baseline for other satellites. [19] Still, we
believe this is not sufficient.
We do not mean to argue that the 25-year guideline is
the answer in and of itself. In fact, we will discuss
shortly why such an overly simplistic rule makes less
sense for such a complicated problem like orbital
debris. We merely hope to highlight that risk of nonadherence to whatever set of rules and regulations is
eventually adopted has a meaningful impact on the
debris environment. This risk, can of course, be
mitigated by technical or physical controls that are
designed to meet the requirement on a consistent and
high fidelity basis. However, it seems clear that
“voluntary” compliance has not been successful to
date in guaranteeing a high level of compliance from
any one type of system.
SUMMARY
With this paper we hope to have highlighted a few
key considerations with respect to the orbital debris
environment. First, the debris environment in low
earth orbit is highly complex. Different orbits have
different physics characteristics (spatial density,
atmospheric drag, perturbations, etc.) that are critical
to any risk analysis. Second, satellite operators have
different characteristics that drive the risk their
satellites pose and face from the debris environment,
including different deployment and disposal plans
ERAU #1175

and different satellite bus characteristics. These
complexities require well thought out rules based on
physics. It is likely that a “one size fits all orbits” or a
“one size fits all operators” rule or rules “will no
doubt create economic consequences, while
potentially not mitigating safety risks significantly.”
[20]
Next, the risk a collision poses to the orbital
environment is probability times consequence, not
just probability. In addition, risk is certainly not
number of satellites or close approaches. Let’s be
more precise and start measuring collision risk in a
meaningful way. We should also keep the risks posed
by and to economically useful constellations in
perspective. At 775km, 850km, and 975km there are
concentration points where the background
environment is on the precipice of debris-generating
events that will exacerbate an already tenuous
situation in LEO. One collision within the C850
cluster will create 16,000 trackable fragments while
one collision between two CubeSats will create 14
trackable fragments. As much (if not even more) time
and effort should be spent on solving the issue of
massive derelicts as regulating constellations.
In addition, given the true state of affairs when it
comes to the complexity of close approach
avoidance, coordination among constellation
operators is necessary. It is proposed that close
coordination between operators is a far more efficient
and effective means of collision avoidance than rigid
rules and customs imposed by a “celestial arbitrator.”
Close approaches in low earth orbit are not a simple
highway (or even air traffic) management problem.
Orbital collision avoidance will require a highly
complex series of mutually interdependent actions
based on an imperfect understanding of initial states
and executed from hundreds to thousands of
kilometers away. We posit that the ability to
maneuver is an added dimension that requires proper
assessment from timelines to execution success
versus a panacea for mitigating all potential
collisions.
Next, assuming the world can come up with a set of
rules or guidelines that will ensure that orbital debris
does not get out of control, regulators should create
workable mechanisms to ensure compliance by their
operators.
Finally, LEO has limited volume and, as such, debris
generation needs to be managed carefully. However,
while current debris mitigation guidelines (and even
the debate over debris remediation efforts) rest on the
impetus to prevent a long-term cascading effect of

Page 13 of 15

orbital collisions (i.e., the Kessler Syndrome), rules
and frameworks should focus on current and near
term space flight safety. The orbital debris
environment does not have to be preserved now for
the next 200 years, it needs to be preserved now for
the next 10-20 years and then rules and frameworks
need to be adapted to the new facts and
circumstances that exist at that later date.
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APPENDIX A. Technical Description of the Poisson
Distribution Applied to Orbital Debris Encounters

CR is represented by:
1

In order to test the hypothesis that the Poisson
probability is an underestimation, empirical
encounter rates (ER) were calculated at various miss
distances (from 500m-5km in 500m intervals) and
compared to a Poisson distribution. The empirical
ERs were calculated from JSpOC data gathered from
May 2015-May 2016 and encounter statistics created
by Integrity Applications Incorporated (IAI) for this
same timeframe. These were then compared to the
ER found using equations (1-4) where ʎ is the
frequency within the Poisson probability density
function (i.e., P(k)) taken from the kinetic theory of
gases analogy.
𝜆 = 𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝐷

1
CR = ∑𝑁
1 𝑃𝐶 = (2) 𝑁 (𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝐷 * T) (4)
= (N2/2) * (𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝑅 ∗ T) / (Vol)

When the encounter dimension is considered to be
half of the miss distance then the collision rate is
equivalent to the encounter rate (ER).
The next logical question is “if we accept the
probability found with a Poisson distribution, when
might the first collision occur?” Using a gamma
distribution this can be evaluated for a given
confidence level in equation (5).
1

𝛤 = − 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝐶) ∗ ( )
𝐶𝑅

(1)
where

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑆𝑃𝐷 =
= spatial density, #/km3
𝑉𝑜𝑙
N = number of derelicts,
Vol = volume swept out by cluster, km3
AC = collision cross section, km2
VR = relative velocity, km/s
𝑃(𝑘) =

𝜆𝑘 𝑒 −𝜆
𝑘!

(2)

where
λ = expected number of occurrences over time, t
k = number of occurrences (k = 0,1...)
When it is assumed that there will be very few
events, the probability of that rare event can be
determined by 1 (i.e., the total all possible
occurrences) minus the probability of no events. The
result is represented by the well-known expression in
equation (3).
𝑃(1) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑡

(5)

Γ is the number of years until the first event
C is the confidence interval
CR is Poisson-derived encounter rate

The table to the right shows the number of years for
the first Poisson event predicted by the gamma
distribution at different confidence levels for a CR of
1/3045. Please note that we have already shown that
the Poisson distribution may underestimate the actual
physical encounter rate so these may overestimate the
time until the first collision event. Using the
empirically-derived collision rate of 1/2500, the first
Poisson event would occur within 25yrs with a 1%
confidence. Note that the SL-16 cluster has been
intact since 2007, so the “clock started ticking ten
years ago.”

Confidence
1%
5%
10%
25%
50%
75%
90%

(3)

The PC is the collision hazard to one satellite from N
objects in the population. When we are looking at PC
we are only concerned about the target, e.g.,
operational satellite getting hit by cataloged debris.
Conversely, when we have a cluster of massive
derelicts we are concerned about collisions between
any two of the N objects in the cluster.

Years Before First Event
31
156
321
876
2110
4221
7011

This is called the collision rate (CR) and is the
cumulative PC for N objects on each other.
1

Note that the ½ term appears to insure that we do
not double count possible encounters within the
cluster.
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